August 28, 2005:

                    PostScript: Synaptic Growth Not Memory

In the text ⁽¹⁾ I said ". . .some types of synaptic growth with learning and . . .won Nobel Prizes. But, they still have not found memory. That's because these growths are not memory per se but are merely ancillary or coincidental neuroanatomic changes occurring through use in the same way exercise normally increases muscle mass."

Imagine how difficult or impossible it must be to study how memory is formed in a human brain with 100 billion nerve cells. Eric Kandel, therefore, . . . chose to study a simpler model system, a sea slug, Aplysia, which has 20,000 nerve cells.

It has a withdrawal reflex protecting its gills which if touched repeatedly, would react less and less. But if the touch is forceful the reflex is amplified, becoming stronger and stronger.

The habituation or amplification effect lasts only for a few minutes. One may say that the sea slug exhibits a short-term memory. If the forceful stimulus is repeated several times, the sensitization may remain for weeks, that is, the sea slug develops a long-term memory.

Professor Kandel . . . showed that habituation to touching was due to changes in the synapse, the contact point between the nerve cells. During habituation less and less transmitter was released.

The forceful stimulus that formed the long-term memory worked in a completely different way. Second messengers activated protein kinases that entered the cell nucleus and started the production of new proteins. This, in turn, brought about a change in the form and function of the synapse. What we call memory is, thus, elicited by direct changes in the billion of synapses that form the contact points between the nerve cells (abridged from http://www.nobelprize.org ).

Precisely because such a simple primitive organism was studied, the simple sparse activities observed gave rise to misleading conclusions which do not satisfy the basic requirements of what memory is.

Depending on the duration, the sensitization effect in Aplysia was arbitrarily divided into short-term memory and long-term memory. But, this short-term memory does not in any way include other forms of truly short-term memory such as the instantaneous memory I mentioned in the text, the type we can instantly re-sense after feeling or sensing (i.e., seeing, hearing . . . ) something. Nor did Kandel in any way demonstrate what such short- term memories are or the mechanisms of their formation. In fact, therefore, in his study, there would be no memory before synaptic changes occur. We simply do not have instantaneous memory or any other type of more extended short-term memory. Obviously, no memory was found.

The only thing found was that when forceful stimulus is repeated several times, the sensitization may remain for weeks to be a form of "long-term memory." Of course this is not something spectacular. After all, we all know that if we read a sentence many many more times, we can retain the memory of it much longer. The only thing Kandel did was observing the same in a lower organism. It does not go to demonstrate what memory is.

In fact, a reduction in transmitter release is only an associated biological phenomenon which in no way indicates or represents memory. Can a reduction in transmitter release be a form of memory? Absolutely not! Otherwise, how are we to distinguish between habituation to one type of stimulus (e.g., touching) and habituation to another type of stimulus (e.g., heat)? The only sound conclusion is that the phenomenon of habituation is frequently associated with a reduction in transmitter release. To state that long-term memory is a reduction in transmitter release is to basically draw scientifically unsound, illogical and fallacious conclusions, trying to make a claim unsupported and unwarranted by evidence. Since in both habituation to one type of stimulus (e.g., touching) and habituation to another type of stimulus (e.g., heat) there may be a reduction in transmitter release, the latter (a reduction in transmitter release) simply cannot represent, much less be, the long-term memory of either touching or [the sensation of] heat.

With repeated forceful stimulation, naturally, just like stimulating the neurons with electrical current, there would often be protein synthesis to even alter synaptic structures. Yet, as I overwhelmingly proved, the latter lack the stimulus-specificity to be memory (see also text): one synaptic change cannot be memory of a red ball, and another change be the memory of a green leaf, nor hundreds of changes occur at one synapse to be memories of these hundreds of stimuli. ⁽²⁾

Furthermore, precisely because Aplysia having only 20,000 nerve cells compared to the 100 billion in a human brain, and only its simple withdrawal reflex protecting its gills being studied;

as warned in the preceding, neuronal responses observed in it would not be as simple and straight forward in more complex nervous systems. That's because, for instance, in the human brain, almost all neurons in the sensory and motor cortex are multifunctional, not in any way dedicated to one simple primitive task such reflex withdrawal of gills. As an example, sensory and motor cortical neurons in charge of the leg muscles or of phonation would have to and can modulate and respond in an almost infinite number of ways to walk or jump or dance in as many ways as people can design and manage. Synaptic changes of the type observed in Aplysia to only execute a simple withdrawal reflex protecting its gills cannot easily or at all occur--- because countless numbers of other activities would use the same synapses even within a fraction of a second of one another. As a result, when I say "how are you" right after "hello," if synaptic changes, which are impossible within such a short period of time, could occur for me to say "hello," are we to say that suddenly synaptic changes occur once more in these same brain neurons to pronounce ""how are you? " Of course not. Within a fraction of a second synaptic changes could not have occurred. The same brain neurons simply must rely on pre-existing neural pathways to say "hello," and then immediately "How are you?" Different muscles are simply activated in different sequences and to different degrees to pronounce different words. It's not that synapses have been modified, but the brain through its own sensing ability selectively activates pre-existing pathways, without modifying the synapses right now, to execute the desired or different neuromusculoskeletal activities. Of course, with training, repeated rehearsals would strength the most frequently used neural pathways. Some of these pathway reinforcement can be synaptic modifications observed by Kandel. But there are others, particularly increased connectivity between the neurons of these neural pathways. ⁽³⁾

The synaptic changes associated with long-term memory in Aplysia therefore was only the result of protein synthesis by microelectric stimulation, a structural change having no memory content (i.e., not remembering whether it's a touch or pinch, or twitch. . ., or white, or blue, . . ..). They thus obviously cannot be and are not memory. The sensory memory is registered in the cortical sensory neurons independent of synaptic changes. Once this memory is there, we can even remember such things as the decision( or command or order) first to push our right leg straight forward, then pull it back. One order is to push our right leg straight forward, the other order 3 seconds later is "pull it back." The simultaneous memory of these two orders enables us to carry them out in sequence. That can be done only because remembering does not require and is not synaptic changes. So, without synaptic changes possible with a fraction of second, we can still instantly remember the different things that are said or/& seen within that short period of time to consecutively activate even the same pathways to perform different tasks (one to push, the other to pull). ⁽⁴⁾

Only because the substance being carried into the brain are electromagnetic particles to first stimulate the brain neurons and accordingly evoke their specific sensations (e.g., red photons evoke a red sensation; green photons evoke a green sensation), and then remain in the brain neurons as memory particles which when reactivated would regenerate the same sensations to give rise to remembering, have the same neural pathways been able to first carry different stimulus-specific eMs in rapid succession into the brain for sensing and remembering.

When I hear "one," then "one, one, one, . . ." in rapid succession, the same neural pathways and brain areas would have been activated by the first "one," and the subsequent one's in rapid succession. That's because one has the same pitch to stimulate the same cochlear nerve fibers and our auditory cortex. Yet, I would sense and instantly remember that I first heard "one," then I heard a lot of one's in rapid succession.

We can do so only because sensation and it's corresponding memory do not depend on and are not synaptic changes. Since they are only electromagnetic particles , they can be one after another in rapid succession carried by the same neural pathways into the brain to evoke their correspondingly different sensations and remain as their corresponding memory pieces.

But if memory is or depends on synaptic changes, this kind of sensing and remembering different stimuli in rapid succession via the same neural pathways and by the same brain areas would be impossible: Sensations and their memories would have to await synaptic changes(one type or one set of changes for each different stimulus. Otherwise, impossible for synaptic changes to represent different stimuli) to occur first before different stimuli can be sensed and instantly remembered. Since we so sense and instantly remember different stimuli coming in rapid succession to be perceived via the same neural pathways and by the same brain areas before there could occur synaptic changes, the latter cannot be sensation-specific (i.e., cannot specify the sensations we experience) and therefore cannot be memories which are and therefore have to be sensation-giving and sensation-specific.

Because the sensation-evoking different stimuli being sensed in rapid succession via the same neural pathways and by the same brain areas can be entirely new to the brain and therefore have had no chance to induce any synaptic changes of their own, sensing and remembering precede and not follow synaptic changes if at all they occur.

What gives rise to sensing and remembering then? Nothing but the stimulus- specific eMs, and hence sensation- and therefore memory- specific eMs. Why "sensation- and therefore memory- specific eMs?" Because, the thing evoking a sensation is the same substance stored into the brain to evoke the same sensation. When stimulus-specific eMs collide with the brain neurons to evoke a sensation such as a red color, these same eMs remaining in the brain neurons would evoke the same red color when reactivated to collide with the brain neurons again.

Actually, long before synaptic changes could occur, repeated stimulation by or input of the same thing into the same nerve pathway and brain area greatly increases the concentration of the stimulus- specific electromagnetic particles (eMs). Sensation and therefore memory of that same stimulus intensifies, making it more likely to remain as the long-term memory of the same stimulus. As well, the memory being intensified becomes more readily sensed by and therefore more easily accessible to the brain. The latter can then more easily select that task for execution which could be a thought or a movement.

August 29, 2005:

                                                The Electromagnetic Mind

The magic of these eMs is that when they are sensation-giving, allowing us to sense them and through them the stimuli they each represents, and when they can be easily stored in the brain neurons to be memory pieces, they are actually what gives us our minds. First, they give us sensing. Second, through their accumulation in our brains (e.g., repeated input or/& re-use to amplify them in the brain), they intensify their being sensed by us. As a result, we can easily select those parts of the brain having the specifically desired sensations (e.g., after repeated use of our hands, we get to know where our hand is sensed in our brain). We can easily select that part of the brain for activation ( e.g., to raise our right hand.) That's because the sensations of our hand having so accumulated in our brains have become our long-term memories of the hands consolidated into the "hand part" part of what's called "sensory homunculus," ⁽⁵⁾ now enabling us to easily sense and select that brain part having these hand sensations (namely the "hand part" part of the "sensory homunculus).

Evidently, because [only] these sensation-evoking eMs can give us sensing, and precisely because long-term memories require that we "recall" or re-sense past events, long-term memories, just like the short-term memories, cannot be anything but these stimulus-specific eMs.

August 28, 2005:

What Kandel demonstrated in Aplysia is one type of what is usually known as neuroplasticity. But more accurately, in the nervous system, as just proven, neuroplasticity has functional significance only at the macroanatomical level. If a function depends on brain neural changes such as synaptic changes or fusion of different brain parts, these anatomic changes must occur first. However, as amply illustrated in the preceding, normal functional plasticity and memory formation characteristically precede by far, do not depend on and are not, neuroplasticity. Different sensations and their memories from the same neural pathways are long experienced ahead of any subsequent synaptic changes in the same pathways. Synaptic changes clearly represent only the structural changes arising from the neural pathways' being repeatedly stimulated by the propagating nerve impulses which already have been carrying sensation-specific eMs to evoke their corresponding sensations and registering in the brain as their corresponding memories long before any synaptic changes could occur. Synaptic changes are more of a phenomenon of pure biosynthesis of cellular constituents (which synaptic changes are) by micro-electric stimulation (which the nerve impulse propagation is) , than anything particularly having to do with sensing and remembering.

Furthermore, if synaptic changes are or are required to form memory, these quite fantastically flexible sensing and remembering different things at the same time would never occur. We can only remain as primitive as Aplysia, executing its withdrawal reflex to protect its gills and while in doing so repeatedly, undergoing the often inevitable synaptic changes resulting from stimulation-activated protein synthesis.

Only because memory is the storage of stimulus- specific electromagnetic particles (eMs) which can in turn so enable us to control our brain activities as in the preceding, ⁽⁶⁾

have we been so flexible in our learning, not requiring synaptic changes to be our memories and therefore not letting synaptic changes limit how rapidly and in how many ways we can change our thoughts or types of response by the same parts of our brain. ⁽⁷⁾

Besides, if memory is not eMs, the scientifically well-established phenomenon of electronic telepathy could never occur. But since it does occur, ⁽⁸⁾

the stimulus-specific sensation-evoking substance causing us to sense the objects which we detect can only be these object-specific eMs also retained inside the brain for future reactivating for us to recall or remember objects sensed in the past (therefore past events).

Under the circumstances, to claim that synaptic changes or protein synthesis is memory is to defraud the whole world, to pass off fish eyes as pearls ( 鱼 目 混 珠 ).

B)  Other related articles NoMonyB/NoMonyB1.pdf         NoMonyB/NoMonyB2.pdf

c) Back to Cheng Neuroscience Centre

                                                 2005(C)Kuan-Chyun Cheng 郑冠群

1.

Cheng, K.C., The Electromagnetism of Memory, Mentation and Behaviour. Volumes 3-19. Unpublished manuscript. Toronto: KC Cheng Press, 1992-96.

Cheng, K.C., Mystery of the Mind. Toronto: K. C. Cheng Press, 1998 b.

Cheng, K.C., The Electromagnetism of Memory, Intelligence and Mind. A video set (132 hours). Toronto: KC Cheng Press,1999.

Cheng, K.C.,

Cheng, K.C., Volition. 2002.

Cheng, K.C., Emotions: a Cortical Repertoire, 2003, 2004.

3.

Cheng, K.C., The Electromagnetism of Memory, Intelligence and Mind. A video set (132 hours). Toronto: KC Cheng Press,1999.

Cheng, K.C.,

Cheng, K.C., Volition. 2002.

Cheng, K.C., Emotions: a Cortical Repertoire, 2003, 2004.

4.

5.

6.

Cheng, K.C., Volition. 2002.

Cheng, K.C., Emotions: a Cortical Repertoire, 2003, 2004.

7.

Cheng, K.C., The Electromagnetism of Memory, Mentation and Behaviour. Volumes 3-19. Unpublished manuscript. Toronto: KC Cheng Press, 1992-96.

Cheng, K.C., Mystery of the Mind. Toronto: K. C. Cheng Press, 1998 b.

Cheng, K.C., The Electromagnetism of Memory, Intelligence and Mind. A video set (132 hours). Toronto: KC Cheng Press,1999.

Cheng, K.C., N Lecture 2001: The Mind in Formation. The Mind of All Creatures. A video. Shenzhen: KC Cheng Press, 2001c.

Cheng, K.C., Volition. 2002.

Cheng, K.C., Emotions: a Cortical Repertoire, 2003, 2004.

8. Cheng, K.C., The Neurophysics of Telepathy. A video, 2^nd ed. Toronto: KC Cheng Press, 2004.